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Modifies provisions relating to the dental professions

SCS/SBs 1164 & 1476 - This act modifies provisions relating to adult cabaret performances. ADULT CABARET PERFORMANCE DEFINITION (67.2540) This act defines "adult cabaret performance" in regards to provisions relating to restrictions on sexually oriented businesses. This provision is identical to a provision contained in HB 1702 (2026) and HB 2407 (2026). SEXUALLY ORIENTED BILLBOARDS (226.531) This act adds the definition of "adult cabaret performance" in regards to sexually oriented billboards. The definition of "sexually oriented business" is modified to include any business that offers an adult cabaret performance. This provision is identical to a provision contained in HB 1702 (2026) and HB 2407 (2026). CIVIL ACTIONS FOR ADULT CABARET PERFORMANCES (SECTION 537.048) This act establishes a civil action brought by a resident of a city, town, or village where an adult cabaret performance is conducted against an adult cabaret performer whose adult cabaret performance contains actions or material that, proven by a preponderance of the evidence, appeal to a prurient interest in sex and occur on public property or in a location that could be viewed by a person under the age of 18. The court may award damages or injunctive relief as it deems appropriate, but no damages, except for nominal damages, shall be awarded in more than one action arising out of a single occurrence. This provision is identical to a provision in SCS/SB 295 (2025) and in SCS/HCS/HB 1464 (2025). OFFENSE OF ENGAGING IN AN ADULT CABARET (SECTION 573.010 & 573.520) This act creates the offense of engaging in an adult cabaret performance if such performance is on public property or in a location where the performance could be viewed by a person who is not an adult. Such offense shall be a class A misdemeanor for the first offense and a class E felony for any subsequent offense. These provisions are identical to provisions in HB 1702 (2026), HB 2407 (2026), SCS/SB 295 (2025), are substantially similar to provisions in SB 764 (2025) and in SCS/HCS/SB 1464 (2025), and are similar to provisions in HB 722 (2025), SB 949 (2024), in HB 1650 (2024), in HB 1849 (2024), in HB 2300 (2024), in HCS/HB 494 (2023), and SB 693 (2023). TRISTAN BENSON, JR.

Modifies provisions relating to gender transition procedures

Creates provisions relating to pharmacists' authority to dispense insulin

Modifies provisions relating to the sheriff of the City of St. Louis

Adds provisions relating to quo warranto judgments

Modifies the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm

Modifies provisions relating to pharmacy benefits managers

SB 858 - This act amends the sections of law which were declared unconstitutional in United States v. Missouri. This act creates the "Second Amendment Preservation Act", and lists various declarations of the Missouri General Assembly regarding the United States Constitution and the scope of the federal government's authority. In addition, the act declares that federal supremacy does not apply to federal laws that restrict or prohibit the manufacture, ownership, and use of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition within the state because such laws exceed the scope of the federal government's authority. Laws necessary for the regulation of the land and the United States Armed Forces are excluded from the types of federal firearms laws that exceed federal authority. Under this act, no public officer or state or local employee has the authority to enforce federal firearms laws against law abiding citizens. However, state employees may accept aid from federal officials in an effort to enforce Missouri laws. Sovereign immunity shall not be an affirmative defense under this act. Any political subdivision or law enforcement agency that employs a law enforcement officer who acts knowingly to deprive a Missouri citizen of certain rights or privileges ensured by the federal and state constitutions, or that knowingly employs a person who has acted under color of federal law to enforce or give material aid to enforce federal firearm laws, shall be subject to a civil penalty of $50,000 per employee hired by the law enforcement agency. In such an action attorney's fees and costs may be awarded. Additionally, a person shall have standing to pursue an action for injunctive relief in the circuit court of the county in which the action allegedly occurred or in the circuit court of Cole County. The court shall hold a hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction within 30 days of service of the petition. It shall not be a violation of this act to provide aid to federal officials who are in pursuit of a suspect when there is a demonstrable criminal nexus with another state or county and the suspect is not a citizen of this state or is not present in this state. It shall not be a violation of this act to aid a federal prosecution for felony crimes involving a weapons violation against a person or for felony crimes involving a weapons violation and a controlled substance violation if such violation is a class A or B felony. The provisions of this act shall be applicable to offenses occurring on or after August 28, 2026. This act contains a severability clause. This act is identical to HCS/HB 1175 (2025), similar to HB 3070 (2026), HB 3130 (2026), SCS/SB 23 (2025) and the truly agreed to and finally passed SCS/HCS/HBs 85 & 310 (2021). TRISTAN BENSON, JR.

SCS/SB 928 - This act modifies provisions relating to criminal offenses. ATTORNEY GENERAL (SECTION 27.117) This act gives the Attorney General concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute certain offenses that occurred in more than one jurisdiction. PROTECTIVE ORDERS (SECTION 455.050) Under current law, a person that petitions for a full or ex parte protective order is protected from certain offenses if the order is granted. This act adds cyberstalking to the list of offenses. RELEASE FROM JAIL (SECTION 544.667) Currently, a person can be released from jail upon recognizance or bond. This act provides that a person that has been released under such circumstances that fails to comply with the conditions of such release that imposes no contact with the victim shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor and shall forfeit any security that was pledged for their release. CRIMINAL OFFENSES (SECTIONS 565.002, 565.050, 565.052, 565.054, 565.056, 565.072, 565.073, 565.074, 565.090, 565.091, 565.225, 565.227, 565.260, 565.400, 565.405, 573.570, & 573.575) This act modifies the offenses of assault in the first, second, third, and fourth degrees and the offenses of domestic violence in the first, second, third, and fourth degrees by removing the defined terms of "serious physical injury" and "physical injury" and providing for the following harms: • Great bodily harm: Bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent or protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ, or other serious bodily harm; • Substantial bodily harm: Bodily harm which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily member; and • Bodily harm: Physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Under current law, the first offense of harassment in the first degree is a class E felony. This act provides that a second or subsequent conviction of harassment in the first degree shall be a class D felony where the individual has previously been found guilty of harassment in the first or second degree. Currently, a first offense of harassment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor. Under this act, provisions relating to a second or subsequent conviction of harassment in the second degree are modified to include a conviction of harassment in the first degree as a previous conviction in which case it is a class E felony. This act modifies the offense of stalking in the first degree by repealing the elements of such offense and providing that a person commits the offense of stalking in the first degree when the person knowingly, through a course of conduct that is directed at another person or through technological abuse, as defined in the act, engages in conduct that would cause a reasonable person under similar circumstances to: • Fear death or bodily injury, as defined in this act; • Fear that an offense will be committed against a member of the person's family, household members, or an individual with whom the person has a dating relationship; • Fear that an offense will be committed against the person's property; or • Feel harassed, terrified, or intimidated. This act modifies the offense of stalking in the second degree by repealing the elements of such offense and providing that a person commits the offense of stalking in the second degree when the person knowingly, through a course of conduct that is directed at another person or through technological abuse, as defined in the act, engages in conduct that would cause a reasonable person under similar circumstances to feel harassed, terrified, or intimidated. This act creates the offense of unlawful tracking of a motor vehicle. A person is guilty of this offense if he or she knowingly installs, conceals, or otherwise places an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle. This offense shall be a class A misdemeanor for a first offense and a class E felony for a second or subsequent offense. This act creates the offense of cyberharassment. A person commits this offense if he or she purposely or knowingly engages in a threatening, aggressive, or otherwise fear-inducing, course of conduct by using digital technology, internet service providers, electronic service providers or other electronic communications and devices cause reasonable fear, alarm, anxiety, undo stress, or terror to others by repeated contact with no legitimate purpose. This offense shall be a class B misdemeanor upon a first offense and a class A misdemeanor for second or subsequent offenses. A person commits the offense of cyberstalking if such person purposely or knowingly engages in a threatening, aggressive, or otherwise fear-inducing, course of conduct by using digital technology, internet service providers, electronic service providers or other electronic communications and devices to enhance the ability to intimidate, track, follow or cause reasonable fear, alarm, anxiety, undo stress, or terror to another person. A first offense shall be a class A misdemeanor and a second or subsequent offense shall be a class E felony. This act creates the offense of disclosure of an intimate digital depiction. A person shall be guilty of such offense if he or she discloses or threatens to disclose an intimate digital depiction with the intent to harass or threaten another person. A violation of such offense is a class D felony if the person discloses an intimate digital depiction and a class E felony if the person threatens to disclose an intimate digital depiction. Any second or subsequent violation of such offense is a class C felony. Additionally, it shall be a class C felony if the disclosure interferes with a government proceeding or causes violence. This act creates the offense of sadistic online exploitation. A person commits this offense where he or she uses the internet to coerce a victim into committing certain acts. This offense shall be a class E felony. This act is substantially similar to HB 3426 (2026). TRISTAN BENSON, JR.

SCS/SB 1078 - This act modifies provisions relating to weapons. This act adds the Attorney General and staff of the Attorney General to an exception to the offense of unlawful use of a weapon. (Section 571.030) This provision is identical SB 1205 (2026), to a provision in SS/SB 77 (2025), similar to HCS/HB 2266 (2026), and to a provision in the truly agreed to and finally passed CCS/SS/SB 1421 (2026), and SCS/HCS/HB 328 (2025). TRISTAN BENSON, JR.

SB 1787 - This act repeals a provision of law limiting the total amount of grants provided through the Missouri Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing to organizations that provide services to deaf-blind individuals and families. This act is identical to a provision in the truly agreed to and finally passed SS#2/SCS/HCS/HB 1840 (2026), HCS/SS#3/SB 1062 (2026), and HB 2408 (2026). SARAH HASKINS

SB 1471 - This act creates the "Act Against Abusive Website Access Litigation". The Attorney General, on behalf of a class of residents of this state, or any resident of this state who is subject to litigation that alleges any website access violation may file a civil action against the party, attorney, or law firm that initiated such litigation for a determination as to whether such litigation alleging a website access violation is abusive litigation. In determining whether such litigation is abusive, the trier of fact shall consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if the primary purpose of the litigation was to obtain a payment from the defendant due to the costs of defending the action in court. The act describes the factors to be considered in making this determination. If the defendant in a website access violation case attempts to correct the alleged violation within 30 days of being provided notice, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the subsequent initiation or continuance of litigation constitutes abusive litigation. Such presumption shall not exist if the alleged violation is not corrected within 90 days under circumstances described in the act. If the Attorney General determines that the website access litigation is not abusive, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the litigation is not abusive. The court may award attorney's fees to the party defending against the abusive litigation. The court may also award punitive damages or sanctions not to exceed three times the amount of attorney's fees awarded by the court. If the U.S. Department of Justice issues standards concerning website accessibility under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, the provisions of this act shall expire. This act is substantially similar to HCS/HBs 1842 & 2150 (2026) and is similar to the truly agreed to and finally passed HCS/SS/SCS/SBs 907, 1154 & 1272 (2026) and HCS/HBs 1694, 1674, 1780, 2056, 2312 & 1755 (2026). KATIE O'BRIEN

SB 1734 - This act authorizes the city of Chesterfield to establish an entertainment district in which licensed establishments may sell intoxicating liquor by the drink for consumption within the entertainment district during certain hours as provided in the act. Establishments shall apply for an entertainment district special license and shall pay an annual license fee of $300. A holder of an entertainment district special license shall be solely responsible for alcohol violations occurring at its establishment and in any common areas. This act is identical to HB 3327 (2026) and substantially similar to provisions in the truly agreed to and finally passed HCS/HB 2057 (2026), SB 1472 (2026), SCS/HB 3000 (2026), SB 482 (2025), SB 1431 (2024), SCS/HCS/HB 643 (2025), SS#2/SCS/HB 199 (2025), HB 2068 (2024), and HB 2348 (2024). SARAH HASKINS

SB 1371 - This act modifies the definition of "joint legal custody" as used in child custody determinations to remove references to allocating, apportioning, or decreeing a division of joint decision-making, responsibilities, and authority between the parents. This act also modifies the definition of "joint physical custody" to change the amount of time with the child awarded to each parent from "significant, but not necessarily equal" to "equal or substantially equal". In current law, there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of "equal or approximately equal" parenting time to each parent is in the best interests of the child. This act changes "approximately" to "substantially". This act modifies the factors a court shall consider when awarding custody to parents, including the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing of their child; any substance abuse history experienced by either parent; the history of domestic and child abuse of any individuals involved; the distance between the residences of the parents; and the unobstructed input of the child as to the child's custodial arrangement. This act is identical to SB 638 (2025) and similar to SB 1013 (2026), SB 805 (2025), SCS/SBs 744 & 1026 (2024), provisions in the perfected SS/SCS/SBs 767 & 1342 (2024), HCS/SS#2/SB 862 (2024), and provisions of the perfected SS/SCS/SB 129 (2023). SARAH HASKINS

SB 1803 - This act creates the "True Charity" Act and the "True Charity" program. The act requires the Department of Social Services to coordinate with various state agencies and a partner network to assist participants in achieving personal goals, self-sufficiency, community integration, and a prosperous future. Participation in the True Charity program is limited to legal residents who are 18 years of age or older, except as otherwise provided in the act. State departments and agencies are required to participate in the True Charity program at the direction of the Governor. In order to use government resources more effectively and efficiently, participating state departments and agencies shall use existing resources and personnel, to the extent possible, to operate the True Charity program. This act is substantially similar to provisions in HCS/SS#3/SB 1062 (2026) and SB 1728 (2026). SARAH HASKINS

SB 946 - Under this act, pregnancy status shall not prevent a court from entering a judgement of dissolution of marriage or legal separation. This act is identical to the truly agreed to and finally passed HCS/HBs 1908 & 2337 (2026), SB 926 (2026), SB 660 (2025) and provisions in HCS/SS/SB 66 (2025), SB 93 (2025), HCS/HBs 243 & 280 (2025), and HB 2402 (2024). SARAH HASKINS

SJR 108 - If approved by the voters, this constitutional amendment requires the Department of Social Services and the MO HealthNet Division to implement work requirements for certain individuals as a condition of participation in the MO HealthNet program. These individuals shall demonstrate compliance with work requirements for 3 consecutive months immediately preceding the month during which they apply and the Department and Division shall disenroll any individual who fails to comply with work requirements. The Department shall submit any necessary state plan amendments to implement this amendment to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services no later than March 1, 2027. This constitutional amendment is similar to SJR 103 (2026), SCS/HCS/HJR 154 (2026), SCS/SJR 43 (2025), SJR 76 (2024), provisions of SJR 4 (2023) and HCS/HJR 117 (2022), SJR 60 (2020), and SJR 32 (2020). SARAH HASKINS

SB 1728 - This act creates the "True Charity" Act and the "True Charity" program. The act requires the Department of Social Services to coordinate with various state agencies and a partner network to assist participants in achieving personal goals, self-sufficiency, community integration, and a prosperous future. Participation in the True Charity program is limited to legal residents who are 18 years of age or older, except as otherwise provided in the act. State departments and agencies are required to participate in the True Charity program at the direction of the Governor. In order to use government resources more effectively and efficiently, participating state departments and agencies shall use existing resources and personnel, to the extent possible, to operate the True Charity program. This act is substantially similar to provisions in HCS/SS#3/SB 1062 (2026) and SB 1803 (2026). SARAH HASKINS

SB 1735 - This act creates the "Lori Zena Baker Act". This act establishes the "Sickle Cell Standing Committee" as a subcommittee of the Missouri Genetic Advisory Committee within the Department of Health and Senior Services, with membership as specified in the act. The Director of the Department of Health and Senior Services shall appoint the committee members. The committee shall assess the impact of sickle cell disease on the state and make recommendations to the General Assembly and Governor regarding services and policies to address the state's needs, as described in the act. This act is identical to a provision in the truly agreed to and finally passed SS/SCS/HCS/HB 2372 (2026) and substantially similar to HB 1483 (2016). SARAH HASKINS